Is the Ukraine conflict a proxy or direct war against Russia? 

Germany metro stations will soon become bomb shelters, while people's basements will become fortified shelters. For the first time since the Cold War, Germany has upgraded its posture for conflict in Europe.  

A crisis is brewing on the continent — an alarm has gone off throughout the land. War could be coming. In quick succession, military chiefs from across Europe are urging their populace to get ready. Political leaders, from Britain to the Nordic countries and the Baltic States, increasingly emphasize that Europeans must prepare for war with Russia. 

The 67-page document, known as the Framework Directive for Overall Defense, envisions the complete transformation of daily life for German citizens in the event of war. It is a further sign of how Germany, which has been staunchly anti-militaristic since World War II, has decided to revamp its security policy in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 

Under wartime conditions, mandatory conscription would be reinstated. Skilled laborers could be made to work critical jobs such as bakeries and post offices. Professionals would be repurposed in various civil service roles.

Unveiling the plans, German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser said in a press conference that it was necessary for the country to better secure itself, given Russian aggression in Ukraine. 

“The Russian aggression has completely changed the security situation in Europe … foremost among our eastern EU and NATO partners, but also due to hybrid threats … cyberattacks, espionage and disinformation here.” 

“In addition to all the protective measures of our security authorities and military deterrence and defense, we must therefore also further strengthen civil protection,” she said. 

The German government is creating a list of public buildings to use as bunkers in the event of war with Russia.  

Germany emerged from the Cold War with more than 2,000 bunkers, although most of these have since been decommissioned. Its current network of 579 bunkers has space to accommodate around 480,000 people, a fraction of the country’s population of 84 million, Reuters reported. 

The so-called “bunker plan” was agreed to earlier this year. But, the recent press conference came just after the U.S. and France both confirmed that they had authorized Ukraine to use ATACMS and SCALP-EG missiles to conduct long-range strikes on  Russian territory. 

The United Kingdom has not publicly stated whether it has permitted Kyiv to use its Storm Shadow missiles, although Ukrainian forces used both ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles in attacks deep inside Russia’s borders, recently. 

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has thus far refused to send Germany’s Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv, arguing that doing so would risk Germany being dragged into direct war with Russia. 

Moscow responded to the ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes by firing a new hypersonic ballistic missile — the nuclear-capable Oreshnik — at a Ukrainian military-industrial facility in Dnepropetrovsk. Russian President Putin has said that further attacks on Russian soil would be met with retaliatory strikes on targets which could include the military facilities of countries providing Kyiv with long-range weapons.

Keep in mind that these are NATO-member long-range missiles; their use is entirely dependent on American and U.K. intelligence and targeting. They will be operated by Western personnel and guided by Western satellites. 

The reluctance by Moscow in the past to sufficiently retaliate against NATO’s incremental escalations has been presented as evidence that it “would not dare respond.” Clearly, Russia’s restraint has emboldened NATO.  

Russia has several more steps to escalate conventionally before the nuclear option is reached. For example, it could intensify strikes on Ukrainian political targets and infrastructure. It could commit North Korean troops into combat or strike NATO assets in the Black Sea. It could destroy satellites used for attacks on Russia. It could attack U.S. or NATO military assets in other parts of the world under the guise of enabling other countries to defend themselves.  

Russia (at some point) will have to respond to further breaches of its red lines to counter NATO’s “incrementalism” — tactics aimed at whittling away at its deterrent. The purpose of such “incrementalism" is to avoid an excessive response from Russia. The U.S. will impose calculated restrictions on how these weapons can be used, as its proxy engages in direct attacks on Russian territory. 

Russian troops are currently advancing (incrementally) in the Donbas, and Kyiv’s Kursk incursion has been halted. This is why Moscow is cautious about any escalation – at the moment, time is on its side. Putin will likely wait for the “changing of the guard” in Washington. 

The war in Ukraine is not progressing to the latter's advantage, and Washington previously admitted that these long-range missiles would not be a game changer.

There is evidence that the overarching objective of the West in sabotaging all paths to peace — continuing the proxy war in Ukraine — has been to weaken Russia as a strategic rival.  

Vladimir Zelensky recognized in March 2022 that some Western states wanted to use Ukraine as a proxy against Russia: “There are those in the West who don’t mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives.”  

Both Israeli and Turkish mediators have confirmed that the U.S. and U.K. sabotaged the Istanbul peace agreement in order to pit Russia against the Ukrainians in a proxy war.  

The timing of Washington’s decision is also suspicious and appears aimed at further sabotage — including Trump’s electoral mandate to end the war. Is Biden risking a Third World War to prevent peace from breaking out in Ukraine? 

Proxy wars and direct wars are not the same thing. Unfortunately, the difference between them is a matter of perception and interpretation by the (indirect and direct) belligerents involved. And unless those perceptions are in mutual agreement, there is every likelihood that one's perceived proxy war becomes another's direct conflict. 

And therein lies the rub with the U.S.-Ukraine-Russia war. Which is it, today — proxy or direct?  

Germany may have been perceptive, indeed, to preclude Kyiv from using its long-range Taurus missiles — they have a range of 500 kilometers (310 miles) — beyond the U.S. ATACMS’s 190 miles, much deeper into sovereign Russian territory. Perhaps a difference sufficient to warrant a perception by Russia of direct rather than proxy engagement. 

It is a fool’s errand to test one's hypothesis about which type of war one is fighting — proxy vs direct — given the awesome difference in magnitude, and thus destructive effect, if one is wrong in one's perception — especially when one's adversary is a nuclear power like Russia. 

F. Andrew Wolf Jr. is the director of The Fulcrum Institute, an organization of current and former scholars in the humanities, arts and sciences.